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This article should be read as prolegomena to the development of a Theory of Education.
In it I argue that the term “educational theory” is multiply ambiguous as it may refer to
a theory of schooling (which is a non-starter), to a theory of education (which is general
and philosophical in nature), or to theories in education (which are specific and empiri-
cal). The article points out the logical primacy of a theory of education in the context of
which we ought to develop specific theories in education. It emphasizes the importance
of a clear and defensible concept of education for educational theory and practice and
argues against the view that education is some kind of activity or process.
Cet article présente les prolégomènes à une théorie de l’éducation. L’auteur soutient que
l’expression “théorie educative” est ambiguë à plus d’un titre, car elle peut être comprise
dans le sens d’une théorie de la scolarisation (qui normalement doit venir après une
théorie plus générale), ou d’une théorie de l’éducation (qui est de nature générale et
philosophique), ou de théories sur l’éducation (qui sont plus circonscrites et empiriques).
Dans cet article, l’auteur met en évidence la primauté logique d’une théorie de l’éducation
dans le contexte de laquelle devraient s’édifier des théories précises sur l’éducation. Il
souligne en outre l’importance d’un concept clair et justifiable de l’éducation pour une
théorie et une pratique éducatives, et s’oppose à l’idée que l’éducation est une sorte
d’activité ou de processus.
Few educational debates are characterized by as much confusion and theoretical
barrenness as the one on the nature and function of educational theory. Despite
repeated criticisms, the prevailing view among most educationists is largely an
architectonic one. Just as architecture (or medicine, or engineering) draws on
several disciplines to solve problems related to human habitat, educational theory
draws on the disciplines of psychology, philosophy, sociology, history, inter alia,
to deal with problems concerning the education of human beings. What is never
made clear, however, is the place of each of these “foundation disciplines” within
the theory; the constraints imposed on these disciplines by the nature of the
enterprise; the relationship among the disciplines; and the character of the
resultant educational theory. This article deals with these questions and sketches
an alternative to the prevailing view. The intention here is not to deal with these
questions in detail — that would require book-length treatment — but to provide
the general framework for their answer.
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THE MANY USES OF “THEORY” AND “EDUCATION”
Unless we are dealing with incurable reductionists of the extreme logical
positivist type, we should expect any sensible discussion on educational theory
to begin with the recognition that the word “theory” has many uses, all of them
legitimate, useful, and important in their respective contexts. We do not talk only
or primarily about the theory of relativity or the theory of evolution, but also
about the theory of numbers, music, knowledge, education, value, and politics.
The meaning of the word “theory” in these examples is parasitic on its subject;
if we want to discover the character of a particular theory, then, we should move
our eyes away from the word “theory” and pay attention to what the theory is
about. A long time ago Aristotle remarked wisely that “it is the mark of an
educated person to seek after that degree or exactness in each kind of inquiry
which the nature of the particular subject admits.”1 It is a depressing fact that his
admonition has often been ignored in this debate. It appears to me naive and
primitive in the extreme to confuse the nature of educational theory with
scientific theory simply because both are called theories. It is equally crude to
maintain today that one of the aforementioned uses of the term “theory” is more
central, paradigmatic, or fundamental and must, therefore, occupy a more priv-
ileged position among theories. Neither etymology nor the ordinary uses of the
word lend support to such claims. If Aristotle’s distant voice can no longer be
heard through the centuries, Wittgenstein’s repeated exhortations most certainly
must not be ignored.
Yet, for example, D. J. O’Connor (1973) has reiterated his old claim that “the
word ‘theory’ as it is used in educational contexts is generally a courtesy title”
(p. 48). If that claim was already unjustified even in 1957, reiteration after 25
years must be considered hubris. His strategy is the familiar persuasive one; he
seeks naively to define “theory” generally, that is, outside its various contexts,
and of course he fails. He then offers his Procrustean “stipulative” definition of
“theory,” which arbitrarily rules out educational theory or renders it inferior.2
A similar problem exists with regard to the word “education”; we do not
always know in which one of its several senses the word is used when people
speak about educational theory. In his last statement on the concept of education,
O’Connor gave only one reference to work related to the subject and that was
to his own views on the concept of education in his Introduction to Philosophy
of Education published 35 years ago — completely ignoring the very significant
work of R. S. Peters and others on that concept! Thus, although he recognizes
that the word is used ambiguously (he wrongly says that “the term ‘education’
is multiply ambiguous”),3 he repeats his 1957 view on the concept, which is a
kind of conceptual stew consisting of socialization, training, and education (1982,
p. 137).
There are two reasons why I refer to O’Connor’s views. First, even his critics
do not always manage to escape his paradigm of what constitutes an educational
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theory, and second, the theory all these writers are arguing about is not one of
education but of schooling.
There is one notable exception. John Wilson has argued consistently and
candidly against the prevailing paradigm but he seems to be ambivalent about the
appropriateness of even talking about educational theory. In his criticism of Hirst
and the standard thesis, Wilson begins by arguing that “anything properly called
‘educational theory’ is a non-starter,” but later he suggests that “the nature of
educational theory must surely be connected with, indeed a function of, what
education is taken to be: and about this Hirst says virtually nothing.”4 Let us then
begin at the beginning, that is, with an examination of the concept of education.
WHAT IS EDUCATION?
I would like to suggest that this is a potentially misleading question because it
may give the impression that “education” refers to some kind of an entity which
we can identify, discover, or locate somewhere. In ordinary language “education”
is often used to refer to schooling or to the education system of a country (as in
“Education in Canada”) as well as to all the things that a person has acquired or
learned (as in “The Education of Henry Adams”). Educationists talk about educa-
tion as a field of study whereas sociologists talk about education in a very broad
sense as “the socialization of the young” — an all-embracing technical concept
of questionable value to educators. Although all these uses of “education” are
legitimate in their respective language games, they are not the ones central to
educational policy and practice. The three important uses of the word are to be
found in the participial adjective (“the educated”), the verb (“to educate”), and
the adjective (“educational”). Thus, in ordinary language we ask whether some-
body is an educated person, whether the teacher is educating her students, or
whether an activity or program has educational value. It is not uncommon to
come across educational writings where it is unclear in which sense the term
“education” is employed, or worse, where the writer slides from one sense of the
word to another. In which of the foregoing senses, for example, is “education”
used in the claim: “All education is political in character”?5
The verb “to educate” may give the impression that education is some kind
of activity, but a brief comparison with activity verbs shows that it is not. All
activities have a beginning, take time, and have an end; educating does not. I
started writing this section of the paper half an hour ago, but I did not educate
my students for two hours yesterday. Educating, then, is not an activity, although
some activities may be educational, others miseducational, and still others non-
educational.6 Although claims that education is an activity are sometimes merely
infelicitous with no serious conceptual consequences, more often they are
misleading because such claims are about teaching or, more commonly, about
educative teaching. Matters are different, however, with the claim that education
is a process.
EDUCATIONAL THEORY 451
It is a much more interesting, important, and complex task to decide whether
education can in any of its uses be described as a process. The word “process”
is widely used in educational writings. Perhaps there is no book in the field of
education that does not talk about “the process of education,” “the process of
teaching,” “the writing process,” and “the learning process,” or about “the
process of understanding” and “the process of critical thinking.” Even one of the
most profound educational thinkers of our times, R. S. Peters, entitled one of his
earlier essays “What is an Educational Process?” (1967). Well, in which sense
of the word “process” could we say that there exist educational, teaching, or
learning processes? I believe it would facilitate our discussion and would enable
us to evaluate the various claims about processes if we classified them into
appropriate categories.7
Legitimate Uses of the Word “Process”
We talk of (a) natural processes (e.g., the process of digestion), (b) human-made
natural processes (e.g., the process of manufacturing a car), and (c) conventional
processes (e.g., the due process of law). For obvious reasons we cannot use the
verb “to process” in the first of these senses but we do use it in the second sense
(e.g., to process a certain material) and in the third (e.g., to process an appli-
cation). We also use the idiomatic phrase “in process” to suggest that, in the last
two senses, something is being made, constructed, or accomplished. What natural
and human-made processes have in common is that they are governed by causal
relationships. Conventional processes, on the other hand, are determined by
human-made rules that may vary from one society or period to another. Although
conventional processes are established to secure order, efficiency, humane
treatment, and so on, they may degenerate into unnecessary, cumbersome, and
senseless “red tape.” Now it seems clear that in none of these senses can we say
that education, in the important three aforementioned senses, could be a process.
In the sentence “In the process of cleaning my room I found my lost book” we
have another legitimate, innocuous, and harmless use of “process” which we
might call the merely durational sense (d). In the context of education we can
say: “In the process of teaching history I learned that . . . ,” or “In the process
of learning to fly I discovered something important about myself.” In all such
examples the phrase “in the process of” can be replaced by the word “while.” All
that these locutions suggest is that human activities, such as teaching the
Pythagorean theorem, and attainments such as learning or understanding the
theory of evolution, require time and effort. One does not become an educated
person miraculously or instantly; that is part of the human predicament. I
mention this innocent use of “process” because with a slight twist it leads to the
next category.
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Slovenly Uses of the Word “Process”
Although not nonsensical, it is pretentiously academic to say that “in the process
of educating the young we must do X and Y,” but it is potentially dangerous talk
if it leads us into the conceptual quagmire of “processes of education,” “the pro-
cess of learning,” “the process of understanding,” “the process of teaching,” and
the nebulous stages of educational development that presuppose such processes.
All this talk, of course, can be just sloppy, careless, slipshod educational jargon.
When in his early essay R. S. Peters asks “What is an Educational Process?” he
is in fact asking “What is an educational activity?” And those who talk about the
processes of learning or educational development may mean nothing more than
that in order for the young to acquire worthwhile learning and understanding they
need time, effort, and a lot of care. In other words, the word “process” might be
used in all these examples in its durational sense. And the stages of educational
development may mean nothing more than that a lot of our concepts presuppose
other concepts which must, logically, be taught and learned first. Unless, of
course, they are not using the word “process” in that sense, and in that case we
are dealing with the following category.
Pernicious Uses of the Word “Process”
The belief that there is some order in the world is, very much like the law of
non-contradiction, presupposed by all our other beliefs and all our actions; it is
what Wittgenstein called a river-bed proposition. And the quest for the discovery
of those laws, regularities, patterns, or tendencies constitutive of that order is as
old as humanity. In the physical sciences the quest has been spectacularly
successful, whereas in the “human sciences” it has resulted at best in confirming
the obvious or the common-sensical. And yet, the temptation to explain human
thought and action as if they were the same kind of physical phenomena as
photosynthesis seems irresistible to many students of human behaviour even
today. Thus, psychologists and educationists continue to talk about “thought
processes,” “processes of knowing or understanding,” and “processes of learning”
as if they were natural processes; but can there be such processes? Wittgenstein
(1953) points out that here we have a
Misleading parallel: psychology treats of processes in the psychical sphere, as does
physics in the physical. Seeing, hearing, thinking, feeling, willing, are not the subject of
psychology in the same sense, as that in which the movements of bodies, the phenomena
of electricity etc., are the subject of physics. You can see this from the fact that the
physicist sees, hears, thinks over, and informs us of these phenomena, and the
psychologist observes the external reactions (the behaviour) of the subject. (no. 571)
Learning, knowing, and understanding do not refer to any kind of overt or hidden
processes, neurophysiological or of any other kind. “The grammar of the word
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‘knows’ is evidently closely related to that of ‘can,’ ‘is able to.’ But also closely
related to that of ‘understands’ (‘Mastery’ of a technique)” (Wittgenstein, 1953,
no. 150). Neither do these words refer to any kind of mental states. “Depression,
excitement, pain are called mental states” but not knowledge and understanding
(p. 59, [a] and [b]).
Those terms, then, that are central to the educational engagement, such as
knowing, learning, and understanding, are all achievement words; they suggest
that the person has come up to certain standards, is able to perform certain tasks.
This is the reason why our concept of education in its important uses mentioned
earlier is a normative one. Our ideal is the educated person whose pursuit of
worthwhile understanding presupposes the procedures, virtues, and standards of
excellence embedded in the various disciplines of thought and action as we know
them today. It is on the basis of those standards that we can decide whether an
activity has educational value and the extent to which a person, an institution,
or a form of life is educating or miseducating.
To be able to have the kind of explanatory and predictive scientific theory of
education that O’Connor and others envisage, education must be some kind of
process. But in the three aforementioned central senses education cannot be any
kind of process. First, there are no natural processes of desirable human
unfolding or development — even the greatest educational romantics were unable
to discover such processes. If there were, they would make all our efforts to
educate unnecessary. Second, there cannot be causally determined educational
developmental processes invented by human beings the way there are such pro-
cesses for manufacturing cars, washing machines, and the like. If such processes
existed they would render education a form of naive social engineering and our
educational institutions would become real factories! Like virtue, however,
education is neither natural nor yet unnatural; it refers to an ideal of human
development whose standards are social. The special character of educational
theory, then, cannot be determined by the scientific study of human nature; it can
be revealed only by philosophical inquiry.
Finally, can education be conceived as a conventional process? It is unfortun-
ate that in the English language the word “education” is used to refer to both
“schooling” and “education.” This often results in a cross-eyed view of educa-
tion, because people usually talk about education while keeping one eye on the
schools. Those who have been talking about educational theory have, in fact,
been talking mainly or exclusively about schooling and the appropriate or desir-
able conventional institutional processes that must prevail in schools. To the
degree that this is happening in philosophy of education it is, in my view, a very
unfortunate development for our society. Among other evils, it reinforces the
belief that the other institutions in society can continue to be, as many of them
largely are, on a permanent vacation from education. This is surely a develop-
ment that must be resisted by all educators because it abandons the idea of the
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educating society, wherein the whole community, with all its institutions, laws,
customs, political order, media, and so on, educates (or miseducates) its citizens.
Pericles of ancient Athens knew that when he boasted that his city had educated
all the Greeks; at our great peril we seem to have forgotten it. I believe the
abandonment of the idea of the educating society is one of the greatest dangers
for civilized life. Even our public schools and universities, which are supposed
to function as educational institutions, have become to a large extent centres of
mere professional training and socialization. Perhaps what our society needs
today, in order to remain open and civilized, is a clear and defensible theory of
education.
An example of a confused and distorted view of education can be found in
O’Connor’s “Two Concepts of Education” (1982). The source of the confusion
lies partly in his misdiagnosis of the problem. He begins by claiming that “the
term education is multiply ambiguous and that this multiple ambiguity is one of
the main obstacles in the way of a satisfactory theory of education. Indeed, it is
an immovable obstacle to a unified theory” (p. 137). This claim is simply false.
As I mentioned earlier “education” is not ambiguous, although it can be used
ambiguously, as it is in this essay by O’Connor. Like many other terms in our
language “education” has various meanings, according to the various contexts in
which it is used. Just as one does not confuse “sharp cheese” with “sharp knives”
or “sharp minds,” one ought not to confuse “education” with “training,” “social-
ization,” or “schooling,” or with a field of study, simply because we use the term
“education” to refer to all of them. If one does, then one is responsible for the
confusion and for the ensuing consequences. O’Connor (1982) begins by talking
about “the aims of education” but since some find that phrase “unacceptable on
philosophical grounds” he is prepared to settle instead for the phrase “the
functions of education” or even “the effects of education” (p. 137). The reason
he doubts the appropriateness of talking about “the aims of education” (although
he does not state this) is a good one, because “education,” unlike “schooling,”
is not in the category of things that could have aims; only human beings and
(derivatively) human actions, programs, or institutions can have aims, and, as we
noted earlier, education in its important senses is not any of those things. But
then, if he is truly talking about “education” proper, he cannot talk about its
“functions” either. So by “education” O’Connor must mean “schooling.” But then
why does he find it inappropriate to talk about the aims of the school as a social
institution? Furthermore, if he is talking about the functions of the school, he
should not confuse those with the aims of the school. The aims of an institution
are those things that an institution ought to pursue or professes to pursue,
whereas its functions are what it in fact does (Kazepides, 1989). It has been said
that clarity is not enough; I agree, but it is necessary.
Although Paul Hirst disagrees with O’Connor on some major issues regarding
the nature of educational theory, it is clear from his writings on the subject that
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he is also talking about schooling, not about education. The major shift in his
thinking is that whereas in his earlier writings he maintained that the principles
of educational practice should be derived from the “disciplines of education,” he
now (1983) thinks they ought to be “abstracted from practice” (p. 12).
One major problem in assessing Hirst’s views is that they are couched in ab-
stract language; in typical Hirstian fashion, no examples of educational principles
are given, as if the nature of these principles was sui generis and obvious to
everyone. But the nature of these principles is not obvious at all. Are they moral
principles or rules of logic? Are they common-sense practical beliefs or are they
discoveries of the “disciplines of education”? Or does educational practice (i.e.,
schooling) generate sui generis principles different from the principles of inform-
ed and civilized life? More importantly, how can one discover or recognize
educational principles or “abstract” them from the practice of schooling without
clearly articulated and defended criteria of education? If they are involved
implicitly in all educational (i.e., schooling) practice, what is the point of making
them explicit? Are the same educational principles regulative of schooling today
in Iran and in British Columbia?
It appears to me that the search for “principles” is a leftover from the old
superstitious belief that educational thought must be scientific to be respectable;
I cannot explain this craving for general principles in any other way. What Hirst
(1983) says about the nature of these principles and the methods for their devel-
opment reinforces this belief:
I would now argue that the essence of any practical theory is its concern to develop
principles formulated in operationally effective rational discourse that are subjected to
practical test. (p. 19)
The best methodology for the development of rational educational practice is, I think, in
large measure an empirical matter. (pp. 20–21)
As I try to show in what follows, this view is misleading in a serious way.
Perhaps the best way to characterize the nature and purpose of building a theory
of education is by borrowing a familiar phrase from Wittgenstein: “we are as-
sembling reminders for a particular purpose.”
IS EDUCATION A CONTESTED CONCEPT?
O’Connor must be one of those who believe that “education” is a contested
concept. To make his definition of education less contentious he opted for a wide
and vague definition that includes also socialization and training. He says:
The programme is no doubt a fairly vague one. I have deliberately made it so in order to
command as wide a provisional agreement as possible. And the areas of imprecision that
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make it vague will be filled out in different ways depending on the society to which it
is related and the tastes, values and social background of those who interpret it. But at
least it is true that educational processes [italics added] as we know them in contempor-
ary society have some of these effects on some of the people who are processed [italics
added] by our educational system. . . . (O’Connor, 1982, pp. 137–138)
It is clear now that O’Connor is talking about the aims of schools in the
Western world and not about the concept of education. Those aims, like the aims
of any social institution, can always be contested. For example, which closed or
theocratic society would accept O’Connor’s (1982) fourth aim, which proposes
to make the young “critical of the information and values conveyed by authority
and tradition”? (p. 137). There have been and still are societies whose public
policy regarding its public schools includes only systematically training, social-
izing, and indoctrinating their young. Could we say today that such societies
have an educational policy? Well, when and why might somebody be tempted
to answer this question in the affirmative? So long as schools exist as public
institutions, their aims will continue to be contested even within the most
homogeneous societies; these aims are not matters of definition but of argument,
based on the information, aspirations, priorities, commitments, and the level of
education of the contestants. Can the criteria of our concept of education be
contested in the same manner?
Our conception of education is ours — that is a tautology worth remembering.
The Native peoples of Canada did not have that concept 100 years ago, and for
the same reasons we could not say that Homer’s cunning Odysseus was an edu-
cated person. Our concept of education presupposes differentiation among the
various forms of understanding through which we make sense of the world
today; it also presupposes those complex intellectual achievements within each
form of human inquiry. Outside of or without such traditions we cannot talk
about education, unless of course we are using “education” in one of its other
senses. Our ideally educated person recognizes the demands of reason within
each form of human experience and has his or her mind disciplined by the
standards of excellence in each universe of discourse. The fact that the demands
of reason are not always clear or easy to articulate does not mean that we can
abandon the search for them; it simply makes our educational task more difficult
or less certain. The search for understanding has a single direction; one is
allowed to take alternative paths, to follow different signposts, to slow down, or
to speed up, but one cannot go back and still claim that one is engaged in
education.
The knowledge and value criteria of education serve to remind us that the
intellectual achievements of humanity that constitute the substance of education
are forms of knowledge and understanding — not mere skills of knowing how to
get along in life, nor doctrinal, superstitious, or mythological accounts of the
world and human experience. Whatever the epistemological status of scientific
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theories, historical explanations, or mathematical or moral claims, the truth is that
no one can get an education without engaging in a conversation with some of the
existing traditions of thought, including the controversies within these forms of
human discourse. Does it make sense, then, to say that the knowledge and value
criteria of education are contestable? Could one become an educated person
without acquiring some worthwhile understanding? Is there an alternative way
to get an education, that is, outside such traditions?
One might argue that although the knowledge and value criteria of education
are part of the logical grammar of that concept they do not enable us to make all
the important educational decisions. Well, they assist us in making the most
fundamental educational decisions; they help us to exclude from educational
programs and from public life all doctrinal beliefs, superstitions, prejudices,
unsupported claims, mere opinions, and non-rational methods of dealing with the
citizens — and a concept that enables us to distinguish between civilization and
barbarism should be considered the most valuable concept in our language. Of
course, the criteria of education do not tell us which specific disciplines,
programs, and books to include in our educational programs and which methods
or organizational structures to use to educate the young. But then why should
they do that? Countless activities and experiences have educational value and one
can choose many combinations of these worthwhile pursuits in designing an
educational program. Likewise, there is a great variety of ways one can teach
children successfully, so long as the teacher is knowledgeable, imaginative,
caring, and committed to a vision of the good society. Our educational paradise,
then, is a pluralistic one. There are many ways one can save the educational
souls of citizens, young and old — unless, of course, one is an orthodox Procrust-
ean who assumes that all young people should have exactly the same educational
diet, that there is only one set of activities that should be included in every
educational program, or that there are only certain methods, procedures, and
institutional arrangements, and, therefore, only one process of education (i.e.,
schooling). Paradoxically, it is usually the same Procrusteans (who want to
impose their educational programs on others) who claim that the concept of
education is a contested one! Our concept of education, which lies at the heart
of an open society, does not require predetermined objectives, specific programs
of study, or official curricula — that is what training and indoctrination require.
Education requires only justified principles, canons of inquiry, and standards of
excellence that are embedded in countless worthwhile human achievements.
I believe that the talk about the process of education is the outcome of a
pernicious form of “scientism” that has permeated our thinking and has contrib-
uted to the unfortunate institutionalization of the concept of education —
education has become confused with the institution that is supposed to promote
it and the conventional processes of schooling have become the processes of
education! Thus, being educated has become synonymous with being processed
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by our education system! The result is that those who have been talking about
theories of education are in fact talking about theories of schooling. The con-
fusion of “education” with the institution of schooling is as serious as would be
the confusion of the concept of justice with a particular legal system. Without a
clear and defensible concept of justice we cannot ask how just a legal system is;
without a clear view of education we can no longer ask what is the educational
value of a system of schooling. We know what sorts of things would count as
theories of education and justice and what would be the nature of such theories;
we do not know what could be the character of theories that would deal with a
host of heterogeneous problems of schooling or a legal system, theoretical and
practical. It appears to me that John Wilson’s statement is appropriate here,
namely, anything properly called a theory of schooling is a non-starter.
A THEORY OF EDUCATION AND THEORIES IN EDUCATION
It follows from the preceding that a theory of education is necessarily philosophi-
cal in character. The central task of an educational theory is to establish clear
and defensible criteria of education that will demarcate the character of our
educational ideal and the scope of educationally worthwhile activities. These
criteria are implicit in the ordinary ways we use the term “education”: we talk
about educational, miseducational, and non-educational practices, programs,
goals, functions, and institutions; we give educational reasons, grounds, and
arguments; we dispute the educational value of certain activities; and we charac-
terize people as educated or uneducated. Educational engagements are normative,
implying both knowledge and value criteria. A theory of education that cannot
give a clear, accurate, and defensible account of these criteria will be unable to
distinguish education from mere training, socialization, miseducation, indoctrin-
ation, and propaganda and should therefore be considered primitive and worth-
less; it cannot guide our thoughts, judgments, and decisions when we engage in
educational policy or practice. The reasons why discussions on the nature of
educational theory have floundered are the lack of a perspicacious view of educa-
tion, the tendency to confuse education with schooling, and the bewitchment of
our intelligence by the scientific paradigm of theory.
Our view of education as an ideal of human development is inseparable from
our idea of human nature and human flourishing and is, thus, constitutive of our
view of the good life. Consequently, a theory of education must be informed by
sound theories of knowledge, value, language, and mind and must be an integral
part of sound political theorizing. Since knowledge is one of the criteria of
education it is necessary that a theory of education be well informed about the
conditions of knowledge as well as about the various forms of understanding
through which we make sense of the world and of human experience. Without
a clear view of what constitutes a knowledge claim we cannot distinguish educa-
tion from indoctrination, propaganda, and other forms of miseducation.
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Equally important to a defensible and useful view of education is the
determination of the value criterion of education. The great danger that threatens
education today is the almost exclusive emphasis on the instrumental value of
educational activities and the hedonistic ethic prevalent in our society and in the
public schools. Particularly problematic are some technocratic and pseudo-
scientific perspectives on human nature and behaviour which, as I argue later,
have distorted our view of the learner, of the nature of learning and teaching, of
education in general, and particularly of moral education.
Similarly, our theory of education will be as sound as is the theory of mind
embedded in it. Our ordinary views of the mind, however, seem to be necessarily
metaphorical, with each metaphor giving a certain perspective on it. Some views
of mind that have survived in the language of teaching are more or less primitive
and have misled generations of educational thinkers, policy makers, and practi-
tioners. “To furnish the mind with knowledge” implies that the mind is similar
to a passive room, “To transmit knowledge” gives the impression that the mind
is a passive receiver, and “To instil or inculcate certain beliefs” suggests that the
mind is a tabula rasa. “To exercise the mind” or “To train children’s reasoning
or memory” suggests that the mind consists of some kind of mental muscles. The
horticultural metaphor of mind conveys the idea that it is like a field that has
been lying fallow and must be cultivated. Some of the most influential metaphors
in education, namely, moulding, growth, and development, are not without their
severe limitations.
Although it could be said, with appropriate qualifications, that education is the
development of mind, it would be a mistake to consider education as being res-
ponsible for its genesis; we acquire our minds through early socialization, not
through education; education is the (further) development of mind. And yet, little
attention has been paid by philosophers of education to those acquisitions that
constitute the prerequisites of educational development.8
These, then, are some of the dimensions of a serious and coherent theory of
education. They provide the philosophical background against which we should
make all the decisions regarding educational institutions, policies, programs,
activities, methods, and so on, and they give us the criteria of what is to count
as relevant and worthwhile empirical research for educational policy and practice.
A theory of education, then, should not be confused with specific psychological
or other theories concerning conditions of learning, motivation, methods of teach-
ing, institutional arrangements, and the like. A theory of education puts severe
constraints on all such theories and to the extent that they meet such constraints
they could be considered theories in education, that is, theories relevant to
educational policy and practice. Theories in education will inform us on what is
conditionally possible and thus they will provide the boundaries of realistic,
effective, and informed educational policy and practice. Nothing I have said so
far suggests that a theory of education is carved in stone; it must be constantly
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enriched by the most sophisticated and refined philosophical thinking and must
reflect our self-awareness and our humanity. When educational policy is con-
ducted in the absence of a theory of education it is usually in the service of
non-educational objectives; vague slogans of various kinds are used then in place
of a theory of education. It is sad but I think true that the history of schooling
is a history of educational slogans replacing one another rather than a history of
the development of a theory of education.
BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATION
I would like to illustrate the importance of the distinction between a theory of
education and theories in education by referring to the way many North Ameri-
can educationists, for the last two decades, attempted to solve what they have
(mis)described as lack of discipline in the schools. In typical American fashion
they have developed a course, usually entitled “Discipline and Management in
the Classroom,” for all future teachers in faculties of Education. My view is that
both the identification of the problem as one of lack of discipline and the
strategy of addressing it are wrong and they suggest the absence of a coherent
theory of education. We might question, first, the appropriateness of describing
the problem as one of discipline. That is, if schools are to operate as educational
institutions and not merely as barracks, then the problem is not simply that
students do not follow certain rules — assuming that the rules themselves are
justified — but that they do not understand and do not follow the fundamental
principles of civilized life. In other words, the problem is not simply one of lack
of order, but one of lack of moral order — a much more complex and difficult
problem to study and solve.
Although various authors are included in these courses (e.g., Rogers, Dreikurs,
Glasser, and so on), the dominant approach is based on the “educational tech-
nology” model which is a child of Skinnerian behaviourism. The incompatible
assumptions about human nature behind these various approaches are never
examined and the theory of education implied by them is completely absent. In
fact there cannot be a coherent theory of education that would sanction the
eclecticism practiced in these courses. Because the problem is perceived as one
of lack of discipline, however, the strategies usually taught to student-teachers
are manipulative knowing-hows that aim at making their students conform to
those rules that would guarantee the desirable order within public schools. In
other words, in the absence of a clear and coherent theory of moral education,
all sorts of techniques for controlling human behaviour, developed for non-
educational purposes, are taught for use in the schools.
The misdiagnosis of the problem is clearly the result of not having appropriate
criteria of educational relevance that would guard against allowing inappropriate
theories developed in laboratories with animals to be used as theories in educa-
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tion. Discipline or the lack of it presupposes certain rules that one considers
legitimate or important. The desirability of discipline depends logically on the
desirability of the rules being preserved. Thus, although lack of discipline is not
necessarily a bad thing for those who violate the existing rules in the school, it
suggests that there is a moral problem in that institution: either the students have
not learned to live in accordance with certain principles, or the institution is
trying to impose on them arbitrary rules that they do not understand and to which
they are not committed.
The exclusive emphasis on the behaviour of the students, then, suggests that
the primary concern of those who want to maintain discipline in the classroom
is to control the students rather than to help them live their lives as thoughtful
and responsible moral agents. The former is simplistic and relatively easy but of
questionable educational value. The latter, on the other hand, is complex and
involves re-examining every aspect of the school as an educational institution.
Teachers must be exemplars of the virtues, attitudes, and form of life they want
to maintain, and the fundamental principles of morality must regulate all school
life. The problem in preparing teachers is not merely to teach them certain skills
and strategies that will enable them to control the students so that the students
conform to established rules of behaviour but to enable teachers to guide the
young so that the young can live their lives intelligently and with understanding
and commitment to the fundamental principles of civilized life.
This very brief sketch of a rather complex problem illustrates, I hope, the very
serious consequences of the lack of a shared coherent theory of education against
which important educational decisions must be made and theories in education
chosen. To put it simply, there can be no theories in education in the absence of
a theory of education. And just as we cannot talk about churches without theol-
ogy, we cannot talk about educational institutions without a theory of education.
NOTES
1 Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, I. ii. 8 (my translation).
2
“My stipulative definition is that a theory is a logically interconnected set of hypotheses
confirmed by observation and which has the further properties of being refutable and explanatory”
(O’Connor, 1973, p. 50). Notice, however, that this definition is not stipulative but a definition
of scientific theory, which is programmatically taken to be the paradigm case of theory; by
comparison all other theories are considered defective copies or poor relatives. See Scheffler
(1960) on programmatic and stipulative definitions.
3 One reviewer of the manuscript of this article says: “The author is pedantic in saying that it is
incorrect to talk of words being ambiguous. One definition in the on-line OED is ‘of words or
other significant indications: admitting more than one interpretation, or explanation; of double
meaning, or of several possible meanings; equivocal. (The common use.)’ The OED reports that
what the author says is a mistake is in fact very common. . . .” Well,I agree with the OED but
I disagree with the reviewer’s conclusion. Unlike vagueness, which is a feature of language,
ambiguity is created by the users of language, it is our failure and if we are more careful we can
and should avoid it; if we do not we are sinners! This is a simple but very important point that
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most introductory books in philosophy make today. Words can be vague but they are used am-
biguously; we are not responsible for the former but we are definitely responsible for the latter.
4 The view that “theory” in education is merely a “courtesy title” is the result of superstition, which
maintains that all human problems can or should be understood by the methods of the natural
sciences, whereas the view that “anything properly called ‘educational theory’ is a non-starter”
ignores the fact that the word “theory” has many uses. See also Wilson (1975).
5 The same reviewer mentioned in note 3 claims that I “privilege one sense of ‘education’” at the
expense of another legitimate use of the word, namely, schooling; that in his province “the
Minister of Education is concerned, to use Green’s phrase, that education enable people to stay
out of jail and off of unemployment insurance. That is, education is a matter of socialization and
training. The Minister would probably be mystified by the author’s concept of education. But the
author dismisses the Minister’s concept.” I feel here that this reviewer and I are like dark ships
passing in the night! I am confident that no minister of education in Canada could be so
uneducated as to confuse education with training and socialization. But let us get the logic of
educational planning straight. There are no inherent reasons why schools should function as
educational institutions. They could be, as they often have been, mere centres of training,
indoctrination, propaganda, socialization (whatever that means), and so on. When we talk about
public schools as educational institutions we say something about the character of these schools
that separates them from military academies, religious seminaries, and professional schools. We
send our children to school so that they can get an education. The important question, then, is
what we mean by education. In the absence of a stated purpose it is logically impossible to talk
about any institutions. So, what is the reviewer’s view of the purposes of schooling? Is he
satisfied with his minister’s alleged view? Should the schools educate or simply train the young?
I have argued elsewhere (Kazepides, 1982) that public schools have various legitimate functions:
to provide the prerequisites of education, to educate, to train, and to socialize. Does the reviewer
suggest that we ought to return again to an undifferentiated conceptual stew like the one
O’Connor recommends? It appears to me that those who are involved in education in any capacity
ought to use a more refined, coherent, and useful conceptual framework when they talk about the
purposes of schools; that is a sign of education.
6 Characterizing education as an activity is a very common mistake that many first-rate philosophers
of education make. Consider, for example, the following statement from Paul Hirst (1983): “In
activities [italics added] like education, the complexity of the elements is greater than in the case,
say, of technology . . .” (p. 14). John Wilson (1975) manages to characterize education both as
an activity and as a process: “We retain the idea that education is centrally concerned with
educating, that is, of education as a characteristically intentional activity [italics added] conducted
by human beings on other human beings, involving a certain kind of process [italics added] and
having a certain kind of point” (p. 35). I suspect that both authors are talking about teaching as
an enterprise, not about education.
7 As far as I know, James McClellan (1976, pp. 14–17) was the first to suggest a similar
classification of the various uses of “process” and I am indebted to him.
8 For the necessity of distinguishing between education and its prerequisites, and the importance
of that distinction, see Kazepides (1991).
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